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Abstract
Players of coevolutionary games may update not only their strategies but also their networks of in-
teraction. Based on interpreting the payoff of players as fitness, dynamic landscape models are proposed.
The modeling procedure is carried out for Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Snowdrift (SD) games that both
use either birth–death (BD) or death–birth (DB) strategy updating. The main focus is on using dynamic
fitness landscapes as a mathematical model of coevolutionary game dynamics. Hence, an alternative tool
for analyzing coevolutionary games becomes available, and landscape measures such as modality, rugged-
ness and information content can be computed and analyzed. In addition, fixation properties of the games
and quantifiers characterizing the interaction networks are calculated numerically. Relations are estab-
lished between landscape properties expressed by landscape measures and quantifiers of coevolutionary
game dynamics such as fixation probabilities, fixation times and network properties.
1 Introduction
For describing evolutionary dynamics the framework of fitness landscapes has been introduced, [Kauffman and Johnsen, 1991,
Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014, Stadler and Stephens, 2003]. A fitness landscape formulates relationships
between genetic specifications, individual instantiations, and their fitness. Together with postulating differ-
ences in fitness over all possible genetic specifications and a moving bias towards higher fitness, the setup
suggests the picture of an evolving population that is moving directedly on the landscape. On a conceptual
level, this picture is based on the notion of evolutionary paths that are created by the topological features of
the fitness landscape. Evolutionary paths are a succession of moves on the landscape with ascending fitness
values. The existence and abundance of such evolutionary paths gives rise to estimates about how likely a
transition from low–fitness regions to high–fitness regions in the landscape is.
Apart from fitness landscapes, another approach for specifying evolutionary dynamics is evolutionary
games, [Szabo and Fath, 2007, Nowak and Sigmund, 2004, Nowak, 2006, Maynard Smith, 1991]. Evolution-
ary games are mathematical models of dynamic interactions between individuals in a population and explain
how their behavioral strategies (for instance cooperation or competition) spread in a population. The main
question is how adoption of the strategies contributes to payoff allocation and consequently to the fitness
characterizing the success of each individual. An evolutionary game becomes dynamic if it is played it-
eratively over several rounds and the individuals are allowed to change their strategies and/or to recast
the network describing with whom they are interacting. Such an iterated evolutionary game comprises of
an evolving population of individuals acting as players and can be seen as an expression of evolutionary
dynamics.
Given the fact that there are two frameworks for addressing evolutionary dynamics, it is natural to
ask about their relationships. Unfortunately, both frameworks are not immediately compatible. Although
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it is acknowledged that evolutionary games cast fitness landscapes, it has become clear that such game
landscapes change with an evolving population of players, [Nowak and Sigmund, 2004]. This is attributed
to frequency–dependent selection. In other words, game landscapes are dynamic. Based on some earlier
results on dynamic fitness landscapes, e.g. [Foster et al., 2013, Richter, 2008, Richter, 2014b], there are
some first attempts at applying these ideas to games, for instance, [Richter, 2015]. In this paper dynamic
landscapes are employed for analyzing coevolutionary games by using and extending a framework introduced
recently, [Richter, 2016]. Games are considered where the players may update their strategies (evolutionary
games), see e.g. [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Greenwood and Ashlock, 2012, Szabo and Fath, 2007], but also
games where the players may additionally change their interaction network (coevolutionary games), see
e.g. [Perc and Szolnoki, 2010, Szolnoki and Perc, 2009a, Tanimoto, 2007]. In particular, it is shown that
the proposed method makes it possible to model and analyze evolutionary games and coevolutionary games
within the same framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, some basic definitions are given, and evolutionary and
coevolutionary games are briefly recalled. Sec. 3 reviews game dynamics, particularly the processes to update
strategies and interaction networks. Dynamic landscape models of coevolutionary games are introduced and
discussed in Sec. 4. It is shown that evolutionary games can be modeled by either player landscapes or
strategy landscapes. As a player landscape is dynamic due to frequency–dependence, it is difficult to extend
such a model to coevolutionary games. This paper introduces a method by which player–wise strategy
landscapes can be aggregated to obtain a game landscape, which is static for evolutionary games and
dynamic for coevolutionary games. The modeling procedure is demonstrated for Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
and Snowdrift (SD) games that both use either birth–death (BD) or death–birth (DB) strategy updating. It
is further shown that BD and DB updating yield landscapes with symmetry properties, and that replacement
restrictions entail symmetry breaking. Moreover, the local topological features of absorbing configurations
of the games are interpreted as absorption structure. It is described how landscape properties may be linked
to fixation via the absorption structure. Sec. 5 reports numerical experiments on landscape measures such
as modality, ruggedness and information content. Fixation probabilities and fixation times are calculated as
well as network measures characterizing the interaction networks of the coevolutionary games. It is shown
and discussed how the landscape measures relate to both fixation properties and network measures. Sec. 6
closes the paper with a summary and conclusions.
2 Definitions and game description
The coevolutionary dynamics of the games considered in this paper stems from three levels of activity: (i)
game playing, (ii) updating the strategy, and (iii) updating the interaction network. The game playing is
done by a finite population of N players I that use one of two strategies pi during each round k = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
A player Ii ∈ I, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , can either cooperate (Ci) or defect (Di). A pairwise interaction between
two players Ii and Ij (which can be seen as player and coplayer) yields rewards in form of payoff (pi, pj) as
given by the payoff matrix (Cj Dj
Ci R S
Di T P
)
. (1)
Here, T stands for temptation to defect, R is reward for mutual cooperation, P is punishment for mutual
defection, and S the sucker payoff for cooperating with a defector. Depending on the numerical values of
(R,P, S, T ) and their order, particular examples of the game are obtained, which have become metaphors
for studying social dilemmas and discussing strategy selection along with the effect on short– and long–term
success in accumulating payoff, [Maynard Smith, 1991, Nowak, 2006]. Most prominently, there are Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) games, where T > R > P > S, and Snowdrift (SD) games, where T > R > S > P .
The payoff pi(k) of a player Ii in round k depends not only on the player’s strategy pii(k) and the values
of the payoff matrix (1), but also on who its coplayer is (or more precisely as to what the coplayer’s strategy
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is) and how many coplayers there are. The question of who–plays–whom in a given round of the game is
addressed by the interaction network. A convenient way of expressing and visualizing the interaction net-
work is by using elements from evolutionary graph theory, [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Lieberman et al., 2005,
Ohtsuki et al., 2007, Shakarian et al., 2012]. Evolutionary graph theory places each player of the population
on a vertex of an (undirected) graph. This graph describes the interaction network and consequently it can
be called an interaction graph. As there are no empty vertices and a vertex can only be occupied by one
player, the number of vertices of the graph equals the number of players N . For each player, its coplayers
are indicated by edges that connect the vertex of the player with the vertices of the coplayers. Such an
edge defines the connected players to be adjacent. Each vertex can have up to N − 1 edges (self–play is
not allowed). As the degree d is the number of edges incident with a vertex, the degrees of the interaction
graph equal the number of coplayers that are engaged with each player in a single round. A graph is called
regular if the degree is the same for all vertices. Hence, a regular interaction graph means that all players
have the same number of coplayers.
The interaction graph can be described algebraically by its (interaction) adjacency matrix AI , which is
called an interaction matrix. The matrix AI ∈ [0, 1]N×N is a symmetric N ×N matrix with entries aij = 1
indicating an edge between vertex i and j and aij = 0 showing that players Ii and Ij are not adjacent.
The diagonal elements aii = 0 because there is no self–play. The symmetry of AI reflects the fact that
two players Ii and Ij mutually engage in the game. From the perspective of player Ii, the player Ij may
be the coplayer. If so, then from the perspective of player Ij , the player Ii is the coplayer. Consequently,
aij = aji in the adjacency matrix AI . If all aij = 1 (except aii = 0), the graph is complete, meaning
that every player has all other players as coplayers and the evolutionary game is understood to be well–
mixed, [Szabo and Fath, 2007]. To summarize, for describing completely and deterministically the game and
the allocation of payoff, apart from the payoff matrix (1) only two other entities are necessary: the strategy
vector pi = (pi1pi2 . . . piN ) with pii ∈ [Ci, Di] and the adjacency matrix AI . This setting deterministically fixes
the payoff p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) for each player. Hence, the distribution of payoff p(k) amongst the players
remains the same if the players were to engage in the game with the same entities for a second time in round
k + 1. Put another way for these entities being constant, the game can be seen as static. Consequently,
making the evolutionary game dynamic requires updating either the players’ strategies or the interaction
network, or both.
3 Coevolutionary game dynamics
3.1 Updating strategies
There is a huge amount of work devoted to the modes of updating the player strategies in evolution-
ary games, [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Ohtsuki et al., 2007, Pattni et al., 2015]. Most models use versions of
stochastic strategy updating based on a Moran process, but there are also works emphasizing limiting the
effect of randomness and including the self–interest of players, e.g. [Greenwood and Avery, 2014]. According
to a Moran process, in each round a player Ii (or more precisely its strategy) is replaced by (the strategy
of) a player Ij . The players Ii and Ij are selected at random, but the probabilities of the selection may not
be uniform, for instance depending on the players’ fitness, which may vary. Versions of stochastic updating
rules differ in several respects. Differences are, for example, the actual probabilities that given players Ii
and Ij are selected or whether or not there is an order between selecting the player providing the strategy
(the source) and selecting the player receiving the strategy (the target). Finally, there may be general
restrictions as to which players are allowed to be a possible source and/or target of another player. Such
predetermined restrictions imply a replacement structure, [Ohtsuki et al., 2007]. Conceptually similar to
interaction, the question of who–may–replace–whom can be described by a network of replacement. This
network is expressible by a replacement graph and consequently by a (replacement) adjacency matrix WR,
which is called a replacement matrix. The matrix WR ∈ RN×N has entries wij ≥ 0, and wij > 0 indicates
that player Ii may provide its strategy for player Ij to receive. The values of wij > 0 contribute to the
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probabilities that player Ii is source and player j is target. If all wij = w¯ for a constant w¯ 6= 0, every
player Ii may be the source to every target player Ij with equal probability. Consequently, if there are no
restrictions, the replacement graph is fully connected with evenly weighted edges.
Amongst strategy updating, the following replacement rules are frequently studied: birth–death (BD),
death–birth (DB), imitation (IM), and pair–wise comparison (PC), [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Pattni et al., 2015,
Shakarian et al., 2012]. All these Moran–based updating rules share that they depend only on random (and
possibly on players’ fitness and replacement restrictions), but not on details of the interaction (for instance
who the source or target are actually interacting with and what those strategies are). Therefore, they do
not account for self–interested players, [Greenwood and Avery, 2014]. This property makes it possible to
disentangle player and strategy in the sense that it makes no difference from which source the target receives
its strategy updating. In other words, for all these updating rules it is possible to specify probabilities that
the strategy of a source Ii replaces the strategy of a target Ij depending only on replacement matrix and
fitness, [Pattni et al., 2015].
3.2 Updating interaction networks
If, in addition to the strategies, also the interaction network can be updated in evolutionary games, the
game is called coevolutionary. However, the players I of the coevolutionary game are functionally alike and
can hence be thought as belonging to the same species. Therefore, coevolution takes place within a single
population of players and is between different features of the players’ function. The focus of this paper is
on coevolving of game strategies and interaction networks. There are alternative settings, such as coevolu-
tion between game strategies and other features or parameters of the players, for instance their ability to
promote their strategies, which is known as teaching, [Szolnoki and Perc, 2008, Szolnoki and Perc, 2009b],
or their temptation to defect, which affects their perception of the social dilemma and leads to multi-
games, [Szolnoki and Perc, 2014]. Apart from the network structure, coevolution can also act on network
interdependence, [Wang et al., 2014]. All these coevolutionary settings are methodologically different from
an alternative understanding of coevolution, which is between different ecological functions (and hence differ-
ent species), for instance between predator and prey, or between host and parasite, see e.g. [Thompson, 1995].
According to the focus of this paper, coevolution in evolutionary games is in essence considering the
interaction network as dynamic, from which follows that the interaction matrix AI must be time–dependent.
There is a substantial variety of schemes and rules for coevolution, [Pacheco et al., 2006, Perc and Szolnoki, 2010,
Szolnoki et al., 2009, Szolnoki and Perc, 2009a, Tanimoto, 2007]. Unfortunately, the topic of dynamic net-
work updating has not yet matured as far as to express for a given coevolutionary rule the transitions
from one interaction network to another as a probabilistic function. Whereas for strategy updating, there
are replacement probabilities for different updating rules, [Pattni et al., 2015], the same is not known for
network updating. However, it might be reasonable to assume that network updating involves creating an
interaction matrix AI(κ + 1) at point in time κ + 1 from a matrix AI(κ) at the previous point κ, for an
integer time variable κ = {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
Such a succession of interaction networks can be modeled by instances of an Erdo¨s–Re´nyi graph. In
this paper, the discussion is restricted to the case where the number of coplayers is the same for all players
and constant for all updating instances. Employing such a model precludes situations where a more highly
connected player possesses high fitness due to its connectedness, but not necessarily due to the effectiveness
of its strategy. For d coplayers, such an interaction graph has degree d and belongs to a special class of
Erdo¨s–Re´nyi graphs, namely random d–regular graphs. Modeling the interaction network by random d–
regular graphs makes it possible to systematically carry out numerical experiments because recently efficient
algorithms for generating such graphs became available, [Bayati et al., 2010, Blitzstein and Diaconis, 2011,
Kim and Vu, 2003]. Moreover, for random d–regular graphs, some analytic results about the number of dif-
ferent graphs are known. This, in turn, corresponds to the number of possible player–coplayer combinations.
As a d–regular graph with N vertices has dN2 edges, the number dN needs to be even. Thus, employing such
an interaction network model implies that we cannot have an odd number of players with an odd number
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of coplayers.
For a small number of edges (= coplayers) d, the number Ld(N) of different d–regular graphs on N
vertices (= players) can be found by enumeration, see for instance the entries in the Sloane encyclopedia of
integer sequences, [Sloane, 2016]. Thus, L2(4) = 3 and L3(4) = 1, while L2(6) = 70, L3(6) = 70, L4(6) = 15
and L5(6) = 1, and L2(8) = 3507, L2(10) = 286884. Note that LN−1(N) = 1 for all N , which means that
a complete interaction network representing a well–mixed population holds only one instance of the matrix
AI . Thus, for a complete network graph the game cannot be coevolutionary. It is always static with respect
to interaction because no dynamic changes can be cast out of a single instance of AI . Further note that
Ld(N) grows rapidly. For interaction networks with d = 2 coplayers, the number of possible player–coplayer
combinations L2(N) can be calculated exactly, as there is a recursive formula for the number of 2–regular
graphs, [Bolloba´s, 2001], p.56:
L2(N) = (N − 1) · L2(N − 1) +
(
N − 1
2
)
· L2(N − 3) (2)
valid for N ≥ 3, with L2(0) = 1, L2(1) = 0 and L2(2) = 0. For d > 2, no formula is known to compute
exactly the total number Ld(N) of d–regular graphs on N vertices, but asymptotic expressions have been
found, [Wormald, 1999]. Asymptotically, and for d = o(
√
N) and dN even, the number is
Ld(N) =
(dN)! · exp
(
1−d2
4 − d
3
12N +O
(
d2
N
))
(
dN
2
)
! 2
dN
2 (d!)N
. (3)
Based on a collection of random d–regular graphs the effect of different networks of interaction on payoff
collecting and fitness can be analyzed, for which a landscape approach is proposed in the next section.
4 Landscape models of game dynamics
4.1 Static and dynamic fitness landscapes
A general definition of a (static) fitness landscape ΛS is the triple ΛS = (X, n, f), where X is a configuration
space, n(x) is a neighborhood structure that assigns to every x ∈ X a set of direct neighbors, and f(x) : X→
R is a fitness function that provides every x ∈ X with a proprietary quantity to be interpreted as a ’quality’
information or fitness, [Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014, Stadler and Stephens, 2003]. In this definition, the
configuration space together with the neighborhood structure expresses a (multi–dimensional) ’location’,
while fitness is a property of this location. The configuration space itself can be seen as an unordered (finite
or infinite) list of configurations that genetic specifications of biological systems can have. The neighborhood
structure defines a (possibly multi–dimensional) order of this list by establishing what is directly next to
each element of the configuration space. As direct neighbors of an element have a neighborhood structure
themselves, this naturally establishes distant neighbors of the element as well.
The definition of a (static) landscape has the consequence of each configuration possessing a constant
fitness value. For several reasons this might not realistically reflect the evolutionary scenario to be described
and may generally restrict the descriptive power and versatility of the landscape model. Hence, assuming
that fitness may change over time, while configuration space and neighborhood structure remain constant,
the definition above can be extended to a dynamic fitness landscape, which can be expressed as the quintuple
ΛD = (X, n,K, F, φ), [Richter, 2014a]. In addition to the elements of the static landscape, there is the time
set K, the set of all fitness functions F in time κ ∈ K, and the transition map φ defining how the fitness
function changes over time. For a discrete time set K, for instance for the integer numbers K = {0, 1, 2, . . .},
the notion of a dynamic landscape coincides with the notion of a series of static landscapes. Hence, two
static landscapes Λ
(1)
S = (X, n, f
(1)) and Λ
(2)
S = (X, n, f
(2)) can be reformulated as one dynamic landscape
ΛD with (f
(1), f (2)) ∈ F and φ describing how f (1) changes into f (2). Such a dynamic landscape model
implies the time variable κ ∈ K to act as an integer counting and ordering scale for dynamic instances of a
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static landscape. Hence, κ ∈ K is numerically tantamount to yet conceptually different from counting the
rounds of an coevolutionary game by k = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Applying a landscape approach for describing evolutionary dynamics requires addressing what may
constitute a configuration x ∈ X and its neighborhood n(x), and also what defines fitness f(x). For the
coevolutionary games described in the previous sections, there are several modeling options, which are
discussed in the following. The actual modeling choice of X, n and f and their interdependencies may either
result in a static landscape or entail a landscape that is dynamic and additionally requires K, F and φ to
be specified.
Evolutionary as well as coevolutionary games allocate payoff to players according to the payoff matrix (1).
For making the payoff p interpretable as reproduction rate or survival probability (and lastly as fitness f),
it has been suggested to rescale p by a positive, increasing, differentiable function, [Allen and Nowak, 2014,
Shakarian et al., 2012]. In the following the linear function f = 1 + δp is used with the intensity of selection
δ ≥ 0.
4.2 Player landscapes
The simplest landscape model of an evolutionary game arises from equating configurations with players
I, which for N players leads to a player configuration space X = I with N elements. The neighborhood
structure follows from the d coplayers that each player has, which can be 1 ≤ d ≤ N − 1. Thus, the
neighborhood of a player consists of all the other players with which it is mutually engaged in a game
according to the interaction matrix AI . Hence, assuming that the players I can be attributed with a
fitness f , such a player landscape ΛI could be specified by ΛI = (I, AI , f). A popular form of such
player landscapes is to place the players on a two–dimensional square lattice and define the coplayers to be
Von Neumann (or Moore) neighborhoods, which consists of the lattices cells orthogonally (or additionally
diagonally–adjacent) surrounding a central cell, [Nowak and May, 1993]. Admittedly, such an arrangement
fixes the number of direct neighbors to d = 4 (or d = 8), but yields a convenient way of visualizing the quality
information over the resulting two–dimensional structure, which might be one reason for the popularity of
these neighborhoods. The most obvious choice of the quality information is payoff p or quantities directly
derived from it such as the linear fitness f = 1 + δp introduced earlier. This has led to label such landscapes
as payoff landscapes, [Brede, 2011].
There are, however, several problems with such a player landscape model. The main problem is that
the configuration is the player, not its strategy, nor the strategies of its coplayers. Hence, with the player’s
and coplayers’ strategies, two quantities decisive for the amount of payoff are not directly attached to the
configuration. Strategies can be seen as ambiguous and polyvalent properties of the configuration of players.
This means that the payoff attributable to a configuration depends on both the player’s strategy and also
on the strategies of its neighboring coplayers. This aspect is known as frequency–dependence, as the payoff
can be seen as to depend on how frequent the strategy that the player adopts also occurs in the coplayers.
Consequently, frequency–dependent fitness refutes the assumption that each player Ii can be attributed with
a unique and static fitness. In short, fitness derived from payoff can be seen as dynamic so that the real player
landscape cannot be static, but should be dynamic: ΛI = (I, AI ,K, f(κ), φ). However, the dynamics of f(κ)
is caused not only by frequency–dependence, but also by strategy updating for which the player landscape
model does not directly account and both these causes can hardly be separated from each other. Hence,
the transition map φ describing how the fitness f(κ+ 1) relates to f(κ) is not straightforwardly definable.
In addition, modeling configurations of a landscape by players means that the neighborhood structure is
expressed by the adjacency matrix AI . A variable interaction network, as in coevolutionary games, therefore
implies a changing neighborhood structure. To conclude a player landscape of a coevolutionary game would
involve changing neighborhood structure as well as dynamic fitness. This may make analyzing such a
landscape rather complicated.
There is another reason for the difficulties to deduce meaningful conclusions from payoff–based fitness
over a player landscape. Topological features of the landscape can be used as a starting point for estimating
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how likely transitions from low–fitness configurations to high–fitness configuration are and also which config-
urations are most likely to be a steady state of evolutionary dynamics. However, which player in a symmetric
game as specified by the payoff matrix (1) exactly is a likely high–fitness outcome of an evolutionary process
is not very relevant. A much more important question is what fraction of the players in the long run settles
stably to one of the possible strategies. In pursuing this question, there are several works that define the
quality information of the landscape to be the strategy to which a player temporarily or finally settles. This
means the ’fitness’ is expressed by the strategy vector pi(k). The results have been visualized by coloring the
players according to their strategy, [Nowak and May, 1993, Nowak and Sigmund, 2004]. Such a model has
the advantage that the spatial and temporal distribution of the strategy preferences can be visualized with
respect to the player–coplayer structure. However, payoff–based fitness as the main drive of evolutionary
game dynamics is not an explicit component of such a landscape and the number of coplayers is defined by
the restrictions of the adjacency of the lattice grid.
4.3 Strategy landscapes
An alternative landscape model arises from equating configurations with all possible combinations of strate-
gies that each player and its coplayers can have. An element pi ∈ Π of the strategy configuration space Π is
comprised of the strategies of any player Ii, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and its up to N−1 coplayers: pi = (pi1pi2 . . . piN ).
The strategy configuration space X = Π generalizes the time–dependent strategy vector pi(k) towards all of
its possible instances. Hence, for N players with two possible strategies, Π contains ` = 2N elements. If
we binary code the strategies cooperation and defection (for instance Ci = 1, Di = 0), an element pi ∈ Π
appears as binary string of length N . Note that for this case the bit–count of pi, bc(pi), provides a simple way
of expressing the fraction of cooperators bc(pi)/N . It is assumed that only one player or coplayer can change
its strategy at a given point in time. This implies a neighborhood structure where each element pi has N
direct neighbors which are distanced by Hamming distance of 1, which is denoted by H1d(pi). For instance,
H1d(0000) = {1000, 0100, 0010, 0001} With such a model we obtain for payoff–based fitness f a unique and
static landscape ΛiΠ = (Π,H1d, fi) for each player Ii and each interaction network. As the game specified by
the payoff matrix (1) is symmetric, the strategy landscapes ΛiΠ are topologically alike for all players Ii. The
landscapes ΛiΠ can be transformed into each other by shifting and reshuffling. For a landscape interpretation
this topological likeness implies that landscape quantifiers such as the number of maxima, or correlation
structure, or information content do not vary over the ΛiΠ.
For N = 4, the landscapes can be visualized in two dimensions, see Fig. 1. It shows ΛiΠ, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
for the payoff matrix
(Cj Dj
Ci 3 0
Di 5 1
)
and the adjacency matrix AI =
(
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
)
specifying a PD game with
a complete interaction network and d = 3 coplayers for each player Ii.
We find that L3(4) = 1 and hence the game is static with respect to updating the interaction network.
Observe that for each player there is only one maximum fitness value (the player is defecting, while all
coplayers cooperate) and one minimum fitness value (the player cooperates, while all coplayers defect). Apart
from the single maximum and the single minimum, there are several configurations that have the same fitness
value. Interestingly, these configurations do not form a neutral network, [Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014],
as they have Hamming distance of 2 and hence are not direct neighbors. From the strategy landscape ΛiΠ
it can be concluded which strategy for the player Ii (with respect to the strategies of the coplayers) yields
the highest fitness and is therefore most desirable from the perspective of Ii. Nonetheless, the evolutionary
path from a given initial configuration may depend on, and be influenced by, the strategies provided to
and/or received from the coplayers. In addition, from the perspective of another player, another strategy
configuration is best. Best configurations for respective players, however, are mutually exclusive, which is a
defining feature of social dilemma games such as the PD. Consequently, each strategy landscape ΛiΠ can be
seen as a building block that constructs a strategy landscape of the game. Such a game landscape would
allow conclusions as to what strategy configurations are adopted if all players and their interactions are
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taken into account. In other words, a game landscape may model the dynamics caused by the strategy
updating processes discussed in Sec. 3.1.
4.4 Game landscapes
Reconsider the game with N = 4 players, for which Fig. 1 depicts the player–wise strategy landscapes ΛiΠ.
At every point in time k, the game can be seen as occupying one of its 24 = 16 configurations. Put another
way, the actual strategy vector pi(k) specifies an actual configuration on the landscapes ΛiΠ. For each player
Ii, its landscape ΛiΠ gives its actual fitness fi(k). The strategy updating process means that one player
provides its strategy for another player to receive. The receiving player changes its strategy. According to
the landscape view this process corresponds with changing the actual configuration pi(k) to a neighboring
configuration pi(k + 1). As the change of configuration affects all players (and consequently all player–wise
strategy landscapes), it entails that all players may experience a change of fitness as well. No player can hold
onto its configuration as long as the strategy updating process is underway unless one of the two absorbing
configurations pi∞ are reached, namely pi∞ = (0000) or pi∞ = (1111).
In the following, the strategy updating processes birth–death (BD) and death–birth (DB) are discussed.
For these processes transition probabilities can be derived, [Pattni et al., 2015], which can now be employed
to define game landscapes. Therefore, it will be convenient to rewrite the landscape ΛiΠ as its decompo-
sition ΛiΠ = {λi`}, ` = 1, 2, . . . , 2N , where each λi` contains the fitness and preserves the neighborhood of
configuration `. Assume that the game is in configuration pi(k) = (1101), which means that player I3 is
defecting, while the three other players are cooperating. According to the PD game, the fitness of I3 is
highest, the three other players have the same (albeit lower) fitness. To start with, let us consider a BD
strategy updating, which selects source before target, [Pattni et al., 2015, Shakarian et al., 2012]. A player’s
strategy is chosen at random with a probability proportional to fitness to be a source (hence birth). The
birth probability of a configuration ` of player Ii therefore scales to
bi` =
λi`∑2N
`=1 λ
i
`
, (4)
where the λi` are the decompositions of the landscape Λ
i
Π containing the fitness. The player with the highest
fitness is most likely to be a source, which is presumably I3 with strategy pi3(k) = 0. Which one of the
three players is the target to receive the strategy (hence death) is due to chance but influenced by possible
restrictions regarding the replacement. Hence, the death probability of a player Ii is
di =
1
N
N∑
j=1
wji∑N
i=1wji
, (5)
where the wji are the elements of the replacement matrix WR possibly restricting replacements of strategies
as discussed in Sec. 3.1. Note that the death probability is independent of fitness and hence the same for
all configurations of each player. A BD (and also a DB) updating does not envisage self–replacement and
hence the replacement matrix WR must have diagonal elements wii = 0. If, on the other hand, there are no
replacement restrictions, then the death probability is invariant over players: di =
1
N for all players using a
BD updating. Assume that all players can be a target and I2 is chosen. Hence, the strategy configuration
after the strategy updating is pi(k + 1) = (1001). The players I2 and I3 have leveled their fitnesses, while
the fitness of both the other players is fallen even more.
Now consider a DB strategy updating, which selects target before source, [Pattni et al., 2015, Shakarian et al., 2012].
Here, a player’s strategy is chosen at random with a probability proportional to the inverse of its fitness to
be a target (hence death). Therefore, the death probability of a configuration ` of player Ii can be expressed
as scaling to
di` = 1−
λi`∑2N
`=1 λ
i
`
. (6)
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Still assume that the game is in configuration pi(k) = (1101) and as the players I1, I2, and I4 have the same
(low) fitness values, one of them is most likely to be the target. Suppose I1 is chosen. Which one of the
three players provides its strategy as a source (hence birth), depends on chance and possible replacement
restrictions. We get the birth probability
bi =
1
N
N∑
j=1
wij∑N
i=1wij
, (7)
which is the same as the death probability (5) in BD, but the target and the source are switched in the
elements of the replacement matrix. Note that only if the player I3 is chosen, a change in configuration takes
place, that is the strategy configuration after the strategy updating is pi(k + 1) = (0101). Put differently,
the outcome of both a BD and a DB updating may be the same, but the probabilities to reach it may be
different.
For a sufficiently large number of strategy updating events (and therefore changes of configuration),
there may be some configurations that the game occupies more often than others. These may, for instance,
be the absorbing configurations pi∞ with a bit count bc(pi∞) = 0 and bc(pi∞) = N . Analyzing whether or
not these absorbing configurations are reached and how long this takes, gives rise to fixation probabilities
and fixation times, which will be discussed in Sec. 4.5. Before, however, we focus on the question of how
frequent any configuration is over strategy updating events. The frequency of reaching a configuration scales
to the probabilities of birth and death discussed so far. Hence, for a BD updating the game landscape
ΛBDΠ = {λBD` } =
 11
2
(
1 + exp
(
α
N
∑N
i=1 b
i
`di
))
 , (8)
can be defined, while for a DB updating, we set
ΛDBΠ = {λDB` } =
 11
2
(
1 + exp
(
α
N
∑N
i=1 d
i
`bi
))
 , (9)
both with ` = 1, 2, . . . , 2N and α being a sensitivity weight. Both game landscapes retain the configuration
space and the neighborhood structure of the player–wise strategy landscapes ΛiΠ, hence using them as
building blocks. The fitness of each configuration ` summarizes via a Fermi function the probabilities to
reach the configuration according to the birth and death events of the strategy updating process. The
fitness of the game landscape therefore depends on the fitness of each player–wise landscape and possible
replacement restrictions. Moreover, different updating processes cast different game landscapes ΛBDΠ and
ΛDBΠ out of the same strategy landscapes Λ
i
Π of the players Ii. Given that the ΛiΠ are topological alike,
and hence might be seen as possessing symmetry properties, different strategy updating rules break the
symmetry of the player–wise strategy landscapes. At the same time, the BD and DB updating processes
themselves possess symmetry properties via the birth and death probabilities (4) and (6). Consequently
(and in the absence of replacement restrictions), the game landscapes ΛBDΠ and Λ
DB
Π also retain symmetry
properties. Replacement restrictions induced by different WR, however, yield another symmetry breaking.
These symmetries (and broken symmetries) are reflected by the landscape properties discussed in the next
section.
The discussion so far has been for a constant interaction network, that is for a specific matrix AI . As
pointed out in Sec. 3.2, network updating can be described by a series of adjacency matrices AI(κ). Hence,
as the genetic description of the coevolutionary game comprises of the strategy vector and the interaction
network, the strategy configurations made up by the space Π could be augmented by interaction configu-
rations built by all possible networks of interaction. Consequently, the Ld(N) different interaction graphs
enumerated approximately by Eq. (3) could be seen as configurations according to the landscape defini-
tions discussed above. However, in view of the rather large number of possible graphs for given N and
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1 < d < N − 2 (a rough estimate of Eq. (3) for d N yields Ld(N) = O(NN )), an alternative model is to
understand different interaction graphs as dynamic instances of the strategy landscape. Put differently, the
dynamics of the strategy landscape is the results of its variability with respect to the interaction network.
A consequence of such a modeling is that the timely order of varying interaction networks could be inter-
preted as temporal neighborhoods according to the neighborhood structure inherent in landscapes. With
network updating expressed as dynamic instances of player–wise strategy landscapes, we get a dynamic
landscape ΛiΠ = (Π,H1d,K, fi(κ), {AI(κ), AI(κ + 1)}) for describing a coevolutionary game. Apart from
the strategy configuration Π with neighborhood H1d and the integer time set K, the quantity fi(κ) gives
payoff–based fitness for each configuration, each player Ii, and the κ–th interaction network. The matrix
pair {AI(κ), AI(κ+ 1)} of subsequent adjacency matrices specifies how the fitness fi(κ+ 1) relates to fi(κ),
thus constructing the transition map φ.
Taking up the example of N = 4 with the same values of the payoff matrix as in Sec. 4.3, but d = 2
coplayers, we get L2(4) = 3 and hence a game that is dynamic with respect to updating the interaction
network. The three dynamic instances are shown in Fig. 2, where Fig. 2a is for the adjacency matrix
AI(0) =
(
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
)
, Fig. 2b is for AI(1) =
(
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
)
, and Fig. 2c is for AI(2) =
(
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
. It can be seen
that the three different networks produce three different player–wise strategy landscapes for each player,
which means that we indeed obtain dynamic changes over the three instances of 2–regular graphs on N = 4
vertices.
Comparing these strategy landscapes with those for the complete interaction network (see Fig. 1) reveals
differences. A first is that for each player, there are now two maxima and two minima. Each player retains
a maximum (minimum) if this player itself defects (cooperates), while its two coplayers cooperate (defect).
The two maxima (minima) come about as it makes no difference for the player’s payoff whether the fourth
player (who is no coplayer as d = 2) cooperates or defects. A second difference is that two neighboring
configurations may build a block of equal fitness in connection with every configuration belonging to such
a same–fitness block. Consequently, there is neutrality in these fitness landscapes. Moreover, these results
suggest that the number of maxima and the degree of neutrality scales to the number of coplayers, which
can be confirmed by numerical experiments for landscapes with more than N = 4 players.
Within the given modeling framework of coevolutionary games, the timely order of the adjacency ma-
trices is not associated with a particular updating process of the interaction network. The main reason
is the general lack of established algebraic descriptions of network updating. The dynamic landscapes
proposed may offer such an algebraic description as the transition map φ can be formulated uniquely for
regular graphs, for instance for the transient between AI(0) and AI(1) of the example considered above
as {AI(0), AI(1)} = φ01 = AI(1) − AI(0) =
( 0 1 −1 0
1 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 1
0 −1 1 0
)
. For dynamic player–wise strategy landscapes
ΛiΠ = (Π,H1d,K, fi(κ), {AI(κ), AI(κ + 1)}), game landscapes for BD and DB updating can be defined ac-
cording to the probabilities of birth/death and expressed as dynamic counterparts of Eqn. (8) and (9). As
the fitness fi(κ) of each player Ii now depends on the time variable κ specifying dynamic instances of the
adjancency matrix, the death and birth probabilities di(κ), bi(κ), d
i
`(κ), b
i
`(κ) are also dynamic. Conse-
quently, the static games landscapes (8) and (9) become dynamic game landscapes: ΛBDΠ (κ) = {λBD` (κ)}
and ΛDBΠ (κ) = {λDB` (κ)}. These dynamic BD and DB landscapes are the main topic of the numerical
experiments reported in Sec. 5.
4.5 Landscapes and fixation
The game specified by the payoff matrix (1) and the updating processes described in Sec. 3 instantiate
evolutionary dynamics describable by the game landscapes (8) and (9) introduced above. As updating
processes such as BD and DB depend on random processes, the resulting game dynamics can also be seen as
a stochastic process. Consequently, stochastic properties such as fixation probability and fixation time have
been suggested for evaluating and comparing the long–term outcome of evolutionary game dynamics, and
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studied widely in theory and numerical experiment, see, for instance, [Lieberman et al., 2005, Nowak, 2006,
Pattni et al., 2015, Shakarian et al., 2012]. These fixation properties particularly account for whether or not
the game dynamics settles on a steady state, and if so, how long this takes on average, and how frequent it
is.
The fixation probability quantifies how likely it is that one of the two strategies that a player can use
(cooperate or defect) spreads to the whole population of players, given that only one player started using this
strategy. According to the landscape interpretation, this corresponds to reaching one of the two absorbing
configurations pi∞ with bit count bc(pi∞) = 0 and bc(pi∞) = N , given that the initial configuration pi(0) = pi0
had bit count bc(pi0) = N − 1 and bc(pi0) = 1, respectively. For each absorbing configuration, there are N
different configurations that can possibly serve as an initial configuration. Hence, as N
2N
tends to zeros for N
getting larger, initial configurations getting scarce in the overall topological structure of the game landscape
for a sufficiently large number of players. The same also applies to absorbing configurations. This is in
agreement with the observation that fixation probabilities generally decrease while N increases (see also
the results of numerical experiments in Sec. 5.4). As there are two absorbing configurations, two distinct
fixation probabilities can be defined, one for complete cooperation and another for complete defection. The
probability to reach the configuration where all player cooperate, bc(pi∞) = N , is denoted by %c, while the
probability of all players defecting, bc(pi∞) = 0, is named %d.
Fixation probabilities can be analytically calculated for Moran processes based on properties of Markov
chains for well–mixed populations, [Nowak, 2006, Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015] and numerically for games
on graphs, [Hindersin et al., 2016]. For games on graphs with replacement restrictions, estimates of the
fixation probabilities using diffusion theory have been reported, [Ohtsuki et al., 2007]. For coevolutionary
games considering dynamic networks of interaction of varying degree, numerical experiments can be carried
out. Following previous experimental works, the fixation probabilities are approximated by the relative
frequency of fixation. The fixation time quantifies how many changes in configuration it takes on average to
reach an absorbing configuration pi∞. This corresponds with the average amount of time needed to achieve
fixation. The notion of fixation time can be refined by distinguishing which one of the two absorbing config-
uration is reached, which gives rise to conditional fixation times, [Traulsen and Hauert, 2009]. The fixation
times for the cooperative and defective absorbing configurations are denoted by τc and τd, respectively.
As fixation probability and fixation time are the most important quantities in stochastic game dynamics,
these quantities are discussed next with respect to the landscape interpretation proposed in the previous
sections. The fitness of the landscapes (8) and (9) derives from payoffs of each player and summarizes the
probabilities that a particular configuration is occupied by the game. Hence, possible differences in fitness
across neighborhoods generate topological features of the landscape. These topological features, in turn,
create evolutionary paths on the landscape, which any evolutionary dynamics has to observe. However, the
evolutionary dynamics is governed by a move bias towards higher fitness, which is not a move imperative.
In other words, the landscape view implies that there are probabilities that the maxima are reached, but no
certainties. Moreover, these probabilities depend on what exactly the topological features of the landscape
are, for instance, on the number of maxima, their distribution and their accessibility. For evaluating the
effect of landscape features, just focusing on the maxima is not sufficient. Therefore, different types of
landscape measures have been proposed which aim at reflecting, in a more general sense, the impact that
landscape features have on evolutionary dynamics, see also the discussion in Sec. 5.1.
Fixation occurs if a succession of changes in configuration leads from prescribed initial configurations
to the absorbing configurations. Fixation probabilities %c > 0, %d > 0 require evolutionary paths connect-
ing initial configurations with respective absorbing configurations. The values of %c > 0, %d > 0 scale to
how easy or how difficult it is that these evolutionary paths can be accessed and maintained. The fixation
time, on the other hand, varies with the length of the evolutionary path. Consequently, by analyzing the
topological structure of the game landscape, it may be feasible to infer fixation properties. This kind of
analysis, however, is impeded by the fact that absorbing configurations in game landscapes are, topologically
interpreted, non–passable points in the landscape. However, non–passable points are not a standard concept
of landscapes. Perhaps most similar are steady states of a landscape, but there is the difference that the
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evolutionary dynamics can, under certain conditions, leave a steady state and there is the even more fun-
damental difference that steady states are by definition maxima of the landscape. Absorbing configurations
may or may not be maxima of the game landscape. In the same way, the initial configurations marking the
origin of the evolutionary path may or may not be minima of the landscape. The numerical experiments
discussed in Sec. 5.4 confirm such a characteristics for the game landscapes (8) and (9).
This line of reasoning suggests that a landscape analysis should take into account that fixation properties
are likely to be related to landscapes via the local (and possibly also the global) topological features of
absorbing and initial configurations. In analogy to the landscape structure, which describes globally the
topological features of the entire landscape, these topological features and their interdependences with
fixation we may call absorption structure. The numerical experiments reported next section address not
only topological features of the landscapes, but also the absorption structure, where the focus is on the local
structures.
5 Numerical experiments
5.1 Landscape measures
Game landscapes can only be visualized as two–dimensional projections up to N = 4 players. For analyzing
landscapes with more players, we need to resort to landscape measures. A first measure we look at is
modality expressed by the number of local maxima #LM . Local maxima are potential steady states on
the evolutionary path. Hence, the number of local maxima relates to the variety of possible evolutionary
paths and consequently to the complexity of the evolutionary dynamics displayed. If there is just one
(smoothly accessible) maximum, then all evolutionary paths converge to it and the evolutionary dynamics
displayed is rather simple. If, on the other hand, there is a large number of maxima, then the possible
evolutionary paths may differ from each other massively resulting in more complex evolutionary dynamics.
For a landscape ΛΠ = (Π,H1d, f) a configuration pi is a local maximum pˆi, if ∀pi ∈ H1d(pˆi), the fitness of this
strategy configuration satisfies f(pˆi) ≥ f(pi). Moreover, if this condition holds ∀pi ∈ Π, then pˆi is a global
maximum.
For evaluating the local absorption structure, we need to consider three further local topological features:
minimum, neutrality, and saddles. A local minimum pˇi has at least one neighbor that has a smaller fitness
and no neighbors that have larger fitness than itself. A neutral configuration p¯i has only neighbors with the
same fitness, which means that a landscape area containing p¯i and its neighbors is flat. Lastly, a saddle p´i
has some neighbors that are larger and some other neighbors that are smaller. In numerical experiments,
the number of local maxima #LM can be computed for the game landscapes (8) and (9). The same applies
to whether the absorbing configuration pi∞ and its initial configurations pi0 are maxima, minima, neutral or
saddles. Consequently, for the dynamic instances of these landscapes, a time series containing the numbers
of local maxima #LM (κ) is obtained. The same applies to all other measures of dynamic landscapes.
There are two immediate problems with analyzing landscapes by modality expressed by the number of
local maxima #LM . First, on a practical level, we find that #LM can only be calculated by enumeration,
which entails the proverbial curse of dimensionality. Second, on a conceptual level, there is the fact that
the pure number of local maxima is a decisive (and arguable the most important) factor defining evolu-
tionary paths, but the distribution of the maxima and their accessibility is also profoundly influential. To
overcome these issues, other types of measures have been proposed for quantifying smoothness, ruggedness,
or neutrality of the landscape. Two of them are studied here, correlation length λ and information content
hIC .
The correlation length evaluates across the landscape how strongly the fitness of any configuration
relates to the fitness of neighboring configurations and hence is a measure of the landscape’s rugged-
ness, [Stadler, 1996, Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014]. For calculating the correlation length λ, a random
walk on the landscape of length Tw is used. The fitness values for each step on the walk are recorded by the
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sequence
S = (f(0), f(1), . . . , f(Tw − 1)) (10)
and thus a series of neighboring fitness relations is obtained. Assuming that the landscape is isotropic,
these neighboring fitness relations account for general changes in fitness across the landscape. Hence, the
autocorrelation of sequence (10) with time lag tL defines the landscape’s random walk correlation function
r(tL) =
Tw−1−tL∑
i=0
(f(i)−µ)(f(i+tL)−µ)
σ2
, where µ = 1Tw
Tw−1∑
i=0
f(i), σ2 = 1Tw
Tw−1∑
i=0
(f(i)− µ)2 and Tw  tL > 0. The
function r(tL) measures the correlation between different regions of the fitness landscape and expresses a
measure of how smooth or rugged the landscape is. The correlation length
λ = −1/ log(|r(1)|) (11)
derives from the autocorrelation r(1) of time lag tL = 1, [Stadler, 1996, Richter and Engelbrecht, 2014].
The information content hIC , [Mun˜oz et al., 2015, Vassilev et al., 2000], is an entropic landscape mea-
sure, which also uses the fitness sequence (10) generated by a random walk on the landscape. It can be
interpreted as a measure of the amount of information required to reconstruct the landscape structure.
From the time series (10), differences in fitness between two consecutive walking steps are coded by symbols
si ∈ S, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , Tw − 1, taken from the set S = {−1, 0, 1}. These symbols are obtained by
si() =

−1, if f(i+ 1)− f(i) < 
0, if |f(i+ 1)− f(i)| ≤ 
1, if f(i+ 1)− f(i) > 
(12)
for a fixed  ∈ [0, L], where L is the maximum difference between two fitness values. The obtained symbols
are concatenated to a string
SIC() = s0s1 . . . sTw−1. (13)
The parameter  defines the sensitivity by which the string SIC() accounts for differences in the fitness
values. For example, if  = 0, the string SIC() contains the symbol zero only for the random walk reaching
a strictly flat area. Hence,  = 0 discriminates very sensitively between increasing and decreasing fitness
values. By contrast, for  = L, the string only contains the symbol zero, which makes evaluating the
structure of the landscape pointless. A fixed value of  with 0 <  < L defines a level of detail with respect
to the information gained about the landscape structure.
For defining the information content of the landscape, the distribution of subblocks of length two,
sisi+1, i = 0, 1, . . . Tw−2, within the string (13) is analyzed. These subblocks stand for local patterns in the
landscape. The probabilities of the occurrence of the pattern ab with a, b ∈ S and a 6= b are denoted by pab.
For numerical calculation, these probabilities are approximated by the relative frequency of the patterns
within the string (13). As the set S consists of three elements, we find six different kinds of subblock
sisi+1 = ab with a 6= b within the string SIC(). From their probabilities and a given sensitivity level  the
entropic measure
hIC() = −
∑
a,b∈S
a6=b
pab log6 pab, (14)
is calculated, which is called information content of the fitness landscape, [Mun˜oz et al., 2015, Vassilev et al., 2000].
Note that by taking the logarithm in Eq. (14) with the base 6, the information content is scaled to the
interval [0, 1].
5.2 Graph–theoretical properties of interaction networks
Networks of interaction may be described by instances of a random d–regular graph, as set out in Sec.
3.2. Based on this description, varying interaction networks have been interpreted in this paper as to
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cast dynamic instances of a landscape characterizing the coevolutionary games. Instances of interaction
networks specify who–plays–whom in the game, which means that even if for each player the number of
coplayers is constant, who in fact the coplayers are is not. As different coplayers may imply different
strategies and hence different allocations of payoff, different networks of interaction may result in topo-
logically different game landscapes. Put another way, if properties of game landscapes vary over dynamic
instances, the variations should be reflected by properties of interaction networks, that is graph–theoretical
quantifiers of d–regular graphs. Spectral graph theory defines several such quantifiers, which take ad-
vantage of connections between the algebraic description of a graph and its structural properties; see for
instance [Biggs, 1994, Brouwer and Haemers, 2012, Cvetkovic et al., 2009, Li et al., 2012, Spielman, 2009],
upon which the remainder of this section about quantification of graph–theoretical properties of interaction
networks relies. The main propose of this quantification is to map structural differences of the interaction
graph to different values of graph–spectral invariants, which, in turn, are interpretable as (graph–theoretical)
network measures. For definitions of these invariants, also see [Biggs, 1994, Brouwer and Haemers, 2012,
Cvetkovic et al., 2009, Li et al., 2012, Spielman, 2009].
The quantities considered are based on algebraic properties of the adjacency matrix AI , or the Laplacian
matrix L = dI − AI , which is derived from AI to include the degree d explicitly. For the matrices AI and
L, the spectra of eigenvalues, eig(AI) = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ) and eig(L) = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ), are starting points
for further consideration. For connected d–regular graphs, we find for spectra of the adjacency matrix AI
that all eigenvalues are real and −d ≤ α1 ≤ α2 ≤ . . . ≤ αN ≤ d, while eigenvalues of the Laplacian L are
also all real, and non–negative as well as sortable according to 0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λN .
A first quantity is the (normalized) energy of a graph:
ene =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|αi|, (15)
which can be interpreted as the spectral distance between a given graph and an empty graph, and can hence
be seen as scaling to the degree of difference between graphs. A second graph–theoretical network measure
based on the eigenvalues eig(AI) is the independence number
ind =
−Nα1
d− α1 , (16)
which is an approximation of the size of the largest independent set of vertices in a graph. An independent
set is a set of vertices in a graph such that no two vertices of the set are connected by a edge.
A network measure based on the Laplacian derives from the smallest eigenvalue of L larger than zeros,
λ2, is termed (normalized) algebraic connectivity
acl =
λ2
λN
, (17)
and scales to how well a graph is connected. Connectivity denotes the structural property of a graph that
removal of vertices or edges disconnects the graph. The Laplacian eigenvalue λ2 = 0 if the graph is not
connected, and λ2 = N if the graph is complete (that is fully connected). Larger values of λ2 indicate
graphs with a rounder shape, and high connectivity and girth, while for smaller values of λ2 the graph is
more path–like with low connectivity and girth. Also calculated from the Laplacian is the expander index
exi = max
(
1− λ2
d
,
λN
d
− 1
)
(18)
which is a measure for the d–regular graph possessing expander properties. The expander index has small
values for all eigenvalues λi being close to d, and larger values for the opposite. Expander graphs are marked
by all small sets of vertices usually having a larger number of neighbors. Thus, they can be seen as their
neighborhood expanding.
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As far as possible and needed, the graph–theoretical quantifiers are normalized with respect to the order
of the graph. Hence, they can be compared over a varying number of vertices and hence players. In Sec. 5.4
results are given that analyze the correlation between the network measures (15)–(18) and the landscape
measures (11) and (14).
5.3 Experimental setup
The numerical experiments with the dynamic fitness landscapes of coevolutionary games consider a PD
game and a SD game with
(Cj Dj
Ci 3 0
Di 5 1
)
and
(Cj Dj
Ci 3 1
Di 5 0
)
, respectively, which is a parametrization
as suggested by Axelrod’s seminal work, [Axelrod, 1980]. The dynamics of the landscape is addressed by
examining the effect of varying networks of interaction. Algorithms are employed that numerically generate
adjacency matrices AI(κ) specifying random regular graphs with given order and degree, [Bayati et al., 2010,
Blitzstein and Diaconis, 2011, Kim and Vu, 2003]. It is checked to see if the graphs are connected. If a graph
fails the check, there are isolated vertices that may bias controlling the interaction network via the graph’s
degree and hence such graphs are discarded. For the experiments, different sets of graphs with prescribed N
and d are generated and used. The absorption structure was analyzed with a set of G = 6000 graphs. Some
experiments studying landscape measures and fixation properties were done with a set of G = 3000 graphs.
These experiments have shown that for a considerable number of different networks, rather similar results
are obtained. For this reason and also to facilitate the numerical experiments, unless stated differently the
results presented in the figures are based on a set of G = 1000 different interaction networks. In all cases for
Ld(N) < G, the complete set of possible networks of interaction is taken. The experiments are conducted
for N even to guarantee the existence of d–regular graphs for all 2 ≤ d ≤ N − 1.
Different replacement structures are analyzed. The experimental setup follows previous works, [Ohtsuki et al., 2007],
and defines the replacement matrix WR as random regular graph with given degree and guaranteed con-
nectivity. Additionally, the elements wij 6= 0 are filled with realizations of a random variable uniformly
distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The degree of WR is set to match the degree of AI . All these experiments
are carried out for BD and DB landscapes. Other updating schemes such as PC or IM can be treated
likewise. For these processes transition probabilities are known, [Pattni et al., 2015], and hence landscapes
similarly to (8) and (9) can be computed. With the conventional PC–based computational resources that
were available, it was possible to experiment within a reasonable time–frame with up to N = 20 players.
All experiments employ a linear relationship f = 1 + δp between payoff and fitness with δ = 0.25. The game
landscapes are computed with a sensitivity weight α = 5. For calculating the correlation length λ and the
information content hIC , a random walk of length Tw = 10000 was used, and the results are averaged over 50
independent walks. Numerical experiments have shown that the results obtained are statistically equivalent
over different initial configurations that the walks starts with. Hence, it appears reasonable to assume for
the tested cases that the game landscapes are isotropic. The information content (14) is computed with a
sensitivity level that scales to the number of players by  = exp (−12−N).
The numerical experiments calculating fixation properties are based on 2500 repetitions. This is a
rather small amount compared to other recent experimental works, e.g. [Hindersin and Traulsen, 2015,
Zukewich et al., 2013]. Some auxiliary experiments with a larger amount of repetition, however, have shown
that the values of the fixation properties analyzed converge well so that the numerical setup used appears
sufficient for up to N = 20 players.
5.4 Experimental results
Fig. 3 shows the landscape measures number of local maxima #LM , correlations length λ and information
content hIC over N and d. The red lines indicate a BD updating, the green lines a DB updating. In
addition to the quantities averaged over the up to 1000 different interaction networks tested (horizontal
lines), the vertical spikes indicate the range between the least and the largest value of #LM , λ or hIC over
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these networks described by the adjacency matrices AI(κ). This presentation and color code is kept for all
landscape measures and fixation properties.
For the SD game, the number of local maxima #LM are given as semi–logarithmic plots, see Fig. 3b.
The results show that for the PD landscape (Fig. 3a) there is only one maximum for all tested N and
d, and both BD and DB updating. It hence is unimodal, while for the SD game the number of maxima
increases with N and is hence multimodal. Moreover, for the SD game, we find for DB updating that #LM
decreases for a given N and d getting larger. Also, for the SD game accounting for #LM does not reflect the
symmetry between BD and DB landscapes, which is not the case for the PD game. Another observation is
that for the SD landscape the number of local maxima #LM sometimes shows vertical spikes indicating the
amount to be not constant for a given N and d and varying networks. In other words, there is a certain
variety in the number of local maxima over instances of interaction networks expressed as d–regular graphs.
Some interaction graphs yield game landscapes with a larger (or smaller) number of local maxima than
average. Further note that #LM/2
N → 0 for N getting larger. All these results support previous findings
about evolutionary games, for instance that PD games and BD updating do not provide an advantage for
cooperators, [Ohtsuki et al., 2007, Zukewich et al., 2013]. Thus, for PD the small number of maxima of the
player–wise landscapes Λipi (compare to Fig. 1) corresponds with the small number of maxima in the game
landscape. By contrast, for the SD game and DB updating not only configurations where the defecting
player earns the largest payoff are maxima of the game landscapes. Consequently, the number #LM is
larger. For the landscape measures λ and hIC in Fig. 3c–f, we find almost identical results for BD and
DB landscapes, yet the different games can be distinguished, albeit not as clearly as for #LM . Hence,
correlation length and information content largely reflect the symmetry of the game landscapes. It can also
be seen that the variety over different networks of interaction is slightly stronger for hIC than for λ. Also,
it is interesting to see that the landscape measures are similar for PD and SD, while modality is different.
A possible explanation is that for the PD game the landscape is, apart from being unimodal, structurally
similar to holey landscapes, [Gavrilets, 2004] where neutral ridges are mixed with holes of lower fitness.
We next analyze the effect of replacement restrictions imposed by the replacement graph not being fully
connected with evenly weighted edges, and focus on the differences between replacement restriction being set
or not, see Fig. 4. A main observation is that replacement restrictions modify the game landscapes, which
is also shown by the landscape measures. For instance, the number of local maxima #LM for the PD game
and DB updating is no longer strictly unimodal (compare Figs. 3a and 4a). Interestingly, for BD updating,
even replacement restrictions do not alter unimodality. These is still just one maximum for all tested N and
d, see the red lines in Fig. 4a. For the SD game, the inverse proportionality between #LM and d ceases,
and generally the number of local maxima does vary more strongly for different networks of interaction.
These characteristics can also be seen for the landscape measures correlation length λ (see Fig. 4c,d) and
information content hIC (see Fig. 4e,f). Here, the main difference is that the measures are no longer the
same (or almost the same) for BD and DB updating. This reflects the broken symmetry that replacement
imposes on BD and DB game landscapes. Generally, replacement restrictions imply landscapes that vary
more substantially over different networks of interaction. Furthermore, as there is an inverse relationship
between ruggedness and correlation length λ, it can be noted that ruggedness decreases as the number of
player gets larger. This effect is amplified by replacement restrictions.
In Fig. 5 fixation properties of the cooperative absorbing configuration pi∞ with bc(pi∞) = N are
given over N and d. The fixation probability %c is zero for the PD game and BD updating, which cor-
responds to previous results showing that cooperation is never favored or beneficial under such an up-
dating, [Ohtsuki et al., 2007, Zukewich et al., 2013]. Apart from this result, %c falls with the number of
players N getting larger, but for a given N , the fixation probability is the same for a varying number of
coplayers d. These results are in line with finding that regular evolutionary graphs are generally isother-
mal, [Lieberman et al., 2005]. Moreover, except for very small numbers of players (N = 4 and partly N = 6),
the fixation probability for the well–mixed case (d = N−1) is the same as for a smaller number of coplayers.
This, however, is only the case for averages over interaction networks. There are for a constant N and
d interaction networks with fixation probabilities larger or smaller than average indicated by the vertical
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Table 1: Local absorption structure for the PD and the SD game; bc(pi∞) = N is for the cooperative
absorbing configuration and bc(pi∞) = 0 for the defective absorbing configuration. Results show the final
absorption structure (F) and the initial absorption structure (I). Local topological features of absorbing
configurations: maximum (mx), minimum (mn), neutral (nt), saddle (sd)
Cooperative absorbing Defective absorbing
configuration: bc(pi∞) = N configuration: bc(pi∞) = 0
PD SD PD SD
BD F: mn F: nt BD F: mx F: mx
I: sd I: sd I: sd I: mn
DB F: mx F: mxa,mna,nt DB F: mn F: mn
I: sd I: sd I: sd I: mx, sd
a Not global for 4 ≤ N ≤ 20
spikes (for d = N − 1 there cannot be a spike as only one instance of AI exists). Hence, these results
suggest that the graph structure of the interaction network does matter for 2 ≤ d < N − 1. Moreover,
which AI(κ) causes the largest or smallest %c varies over N and d. Regarding the fixation times τc, similar
observations can be made. Note that for the PD game no fixation time for BD updating are given as the
fixation probability is zero. For the SD game the fixation times for BD updating are much larger than for
DB. Fixation properties of the defective absorbing configuration pi∞ with bc(pi∞) = 0 are given in Fig. 6. All
game settings produce fixation probabilities %d > 0. Apart from this, the results are similar to the general
trends for the cooperative absorption, namely fixation probability differs for BD and DB updating, falls
with an increasing number of players N and is isothermal for given N and a varying number of coplayers d.
The fixation times τd in Fig. 6c,d also show some similarity, but also differences. The main observation is
that for the SD game the maximal fixation times are not substantially larger than for the PD game.
We next consider the local absorption structure of the game landscapes, which is based on up to 6000
different interaction matrices AI(κ). The results for the PD and SD game with BD and DB landscapes
are given in Tab. 1. The final absorption structure (F) indicates the local topological features of the
absorbing configurations pi∞, while the initial absorption structure (I) denotes the features of the initial
configurations pi0 from where potential paths to the absorbing configuration may start. There are four
different local topological features (maximum, minimum, neutral, and saddle), which are given for both
the cooperative absorbing configuration with bc(pi∞) = N and the defective absorbing configuration with
bc(pi∞) = 0. The results in Tab. 1 show some general properties of the local absorption structure for the
game settings considered, which in turn can be interpreted as specific for the game landscape proposed by
Eqn. (8) and (9). A first general property is that for both games and both absorbing configurations, the
absorption structure of BD updating generally differs from DB updating. This may answer the question
of why game landscapes that are symmetric with respect to BD and DB for no replacement restrictions
yield fixation properties that do differ from BD to DB. A possible explanation is that while the game
landscapes are topologically the same as shown by the landscape measures λ and hIC (see Figs. 3c,d and
3e,f), their absorption structure is not. This suggests the absorption structure to be a determining factor in
the relationships between game landscapes and fixation. A second general property is that the absorption
structure is inverse complementary for BD and DB, the meaning of which is that if there is a maximum
for BD, then DB has a minimum, and vice versa, while a saddle remains a saddle. This follows from the
symmetry properties via the birth and death probabilities (4) and (6) as discussed in Sec. 4.4. There is an
exception with the cooperative absorption of the SD game discussed later.
The local absorption structure also shows differences between the social dilemma games. A property
specific for the PD game is that there is no variety over the number of players and coplayers. In other words,
within a given game setting changing the number of players and coplayers does not alter the absorption
structure. This also applies to a general absence of variety over different interaction matrices AI(κ). At least
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for the interaction matrices tested, the absorption structure is invariant over interaction networks. Also, the
maxima/minima of the absorption structure are global. For the SD game the results are slightly different.
For this game setting, we find that the cooperative final absorbing configuration is neutral for BD updating,
and a combination of maximal, minimal and neutral for DB updating. Further analysis shows that these
topological features vary over N , d and AI(κ). For most N and d the absorbing configuration is neutral,
while for a few N and d it is either a maximum or a minimum. In these cases, the topological features are
fixed for varying interaction networks. In addition, there are N and d for which varying interaction networks
give either a mixture of maxima and neutral, or a mixture of minima and neutral. For the defective absorbing
structure, the initial configurations vary over AI(κ), where for most N and d we have saddles, while for
some other N and d there is a mix of saddles and maxima. Also, for the cooperative absorption structure
and DB, the maxima/minima are local, not global. Numerical evaluation affirms that such a variety of the
topological features of the absorption structure over interaction networks can be observed for other game
settings as well, particularly those on the line 2T = 11 +P −S. The SD game with T = 5 is exactly on this
line for the parametrization used (R = 3, S = 1, P = 0).
Based on the absorption structure of the game landscapes, the next set of numerical results deals with
correlations between landscape measures and fixation properties. As already discussed in Sec. 4.5, relation-
ships between topological structures of the game landscapes and fixation events are likely to be shaped and
typified by the absorption structure. The results for the correlations between landscape measures and fixa-
tion properties are shown in Fig. 7 for the cooperative absorbing configuration and Fig. 8 for the defective
absorbing configuration. The results are for all game settings considered with red markers indicating a PD
game with BD updating, green PD game and DB, blue is SD game with BD and yellow SD and DB. The
lines connecting the markers are depicted to ease following trends. The Pearson product–moment correla-
tion coefficient is calculated to aggregate over interaction networks and the number of players N for each
number of coplayers d. The advantages of such a mode of calculation are that the database for analyzing
correlations becomes sufficiently large (it comprised of data for the instance of interaction matrices AI(κ)
times the number of players N) and that trends over a varying number of players are captured. However,
there should be an awareness that the calculation implicitly assumes that fixation properties and landscape
measures scale on N in ways compatible with the dependence on AI(κ).
Comparing the results in Fig. 7 tells us that the correlations between λ and either %c or τc are volatile
and hardly evaluable, while for hIC there are clear trends. The same can be said about the defective fixation,
see Fig. 8 for %d and τd. Further analysis (not shown in a figure) confirms this to remain if the calculation
is done for each N and d. Hence, it appears to be justified to conclude that the information content hIC
correlates more clearly to fixation properties than the correlation length λ. Another results (also not shown
in a figure for brevity reasons) shows that the number of local maxima #LM also correlates poorly to fixation
properties. Apart from the fact that there is no correlation for the PD game, BD updating and the fixation
of cooperation as %c = 0, there are further results to note. For d = 19, the correlations are always zero. This
is why: with the experimental setup employed (see Sec. 5.3) only for N = 20, there can be d = 19, with
the additionally meaning that such a game is well–mixed with just one instance of the interaction matrix
AI . As correlation cannot be based on a single data pair, the correlation must be zero. Furthermore, it
can be seen that there is a negative correlation between hIC and %c (and %d), while the correlation between
hIC and τc (and τd) is positive. This appears reasonable as the fixation probabilities fall with increasing
number of players N , yet the fixation times grow. Also, it can be observed that generally the correlations
are strongest for small number of players and weaken before they reach zero for d = 19.
Regarding the shaping and typifying effect of absorption, the following can be observed comparing the
local absorption structure in Tab. 1 with the correlations in Figs. 7 and 8. From a topological point of
view the correlation should be particularly strong if the absorbing configuration is a maximum and the
initial configurations are all minima. For absorbing and initial configurations being minima and maxima,
the opposite should apply. Only for one example the final absorbing configuration is a maximum and the
initial configurations are minima for all N , d and AI(κ): the defective absorption of the SD game with
BD. For this case, the correlation between hIC and %d is indeed slightly stronger than for the other cases.
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However, for the correlation between hIC and τd the opposite is true. In general, it can be noted that the
correlations for all settings (except PD–BD for the cooperative absorption) are clearly visible and rather
similar. It can be concluded that while there are some hints in the local absorption structure to explain
the correlations between landscape measures and fixation properties, the explanatory framework should not
be overstretched. Analogous to a landscape analysis that only focuses on selected points in the landscape
(for instance the maxima/minima), the local absorption structure only captures a subset of the topological
structures that shape coevolutionary game dynamics. Therefore, extensions toward a global absorption
structure seem desirable.
A last set of experiments reports correlations between landscape measures and network measures of the
interaction matrices AI(κ). Figs. 9 and 10 give the correlations between information content hIC and either
graph energy, Eq. (15), independence number, Eq. (16), algebraic connectivity, Eq. (17), or expander index,
Eq. (18). Again, the Pearson coefficient is used aggregating over interaction networks and the number of
players N for each number of coplayers d. The same color code for the game settings as for the correlations
with fixation properties is used. It can be seen that the information content correlates well to all networks
measures, see Fig. 9. It is conspicuous that the results are indistinguishable for BD and DB landscapes,
which fully reflects the symmetry properties of these landscapes. The symmetry is broken by replacements
restrictions. The correlations between the network measures and hIC reported in Fig. 10 confirm this as there
are differences between BD and DB for replacement restrictions. The correlations, however, are less smooth
over d as compared to the results in Fig. 9, which is most likely due to the additional stochastic nature of
replacement restrictions. Lastly, two more observations can be noted. A first is that the correlations between
hIC and the networks measures are negative for graphs energy, independence number and expander index,
while they are positive for algebraic connectivity. The main reason is that amongst the network measures
studied only algebraic connectivity increases continuously for d getting larger in both mean and variance
over instances of the interaction matrices AI(κ). A second is that for the graph energy and the expander
index the correlations are weak for both small numbers of coplayers (d < 6) before they get stronger to
weaken again for larger number of players (d > 16). For the other two network measures the weakening is
only for d > 16, which is similar to the correlations with fixation properties.
5.5 Discussion
The experimental results given above set out relationships between landscape measures and both fixation
properties and network properties, and argue that dynamic landscape models of coevolutionary games are
viable. In this section, features and implications of such a modeling approach are discussed, the experimental
findings of Sec. 5.4 are put into context, and some concluding observations are offered.
1. An essential part of the numerical experiments is the study of correlations between landscape mea-
sures and both fixation properties and quantifiers of the networks of interaction. A main results
is that information content scales well to fixation properties such as fixation probability and fixa-
tion time, see Figs. 7 and 8. Particularly ruggedness as measured by the correlation length relates
less clearly and much weaker to fixation properties than information content, which is understood
to account not specifically for ruggedness, but more for the interplay between smooth, rugged and
flat landscape areas. Hence, a conclusion may be that also for game landscapes ruggedness alone
is not a good predictor for evolutionary dynamics, as also reported for other types of fitness land-
scapes, [Malan and Engelbrecht, 2013]. There are additional entropic landscape measures based on
the information content, for instance partial information content, information stability or density–
basin information, [Mun˜oz et al., 2015, Vassilev et al., 2000]. Thus, it might be interesting to study
whether these measures also scale well for game landscapes and may offer further insight into game
dynamics. Regarding the correlations between landscape measures and quantifiers of interaction net-
works, the results are more consistent, see Figs. 9 and 10. There are clear correlations for all four
of the network measures considered, with algebraic connectivity and independence number scaling
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slightly better than graph energy and expander index. However, it should be noted that the correla-
tions established between the landscape measures and network measures are based on the Laplacian
or adjacency spectra of the adjacency matrix AI . As these spectra do not uniquely determine the
interaction graph, there might be correlations between the graph structure of the interaction network
and the game landscape that are not captured. The discussion might be extendable by considering
alternatives, for instance generalized graph distance measures as reported by [Gu et al., 2016].
2. The experiments studying the effect of different networks of interaction with given N and d on fixation
properties and landscape measures only report mean, maximum, and minimum values and their inter-
dependencies. Further statistical analysis, for instance considering variances or higher–order moments,
is deliberately omitted. The main argument is that we should beware of drawing conclusions based
on such a statistical analysis as it is not clear if it really produces generalizable results. To illustrate
the point, let us consider d = 2 coplayers, for which the number of different graphs can be enumerated
exactly by Eq. (2). The experiments presented are for up to N = 20 players. Accordingly, at the
upper limit of the experimental setup, we find L2(20) ≈ 1.4 · 1017. There is no alternative but to
conclude that any number of numerically testable networks of interaction represents just a tiny subset
of all interaction networks. At the same time it is far from being clear how well the finite number
of graphs generated by the numerical procedures represents all possible different graphs for given N
and d. Thus, it might be possible that some trends are biased by the algorithmic process of numer-
ically generating interaction networks AI . Further work is needed to clarify these interdependencies.
Such a work should go along with categorizing interaction matrices into clusters. These clusters could
quantify, on the one hand, similar fixation properties of the coevolutionary games, and on the other,
similar spectral properties or similar generalized graph distance measures of the interaction matrices
as mentioned above. Hence, it might be possible to study the effect of network properties of the
interaction matrix on coevolutionary game dynamics for a larger number of networks.
3. The experimental results showing landscape measures and their correlations to fixation properties
as well as to graph–theoretical quantities of the interaction networks are for the specific algebraic
description of the game landscapes (8) and (9). The algebraic form of how to cumulate death and
birth probabilities from the player–wise strategy landscapes is definatory and was employed as it fitted
well to fixation properties and previous results known about social dilemma game dynamics. It is an
open question whether an alternative algebraic form of (8) and (9) can achieve similar or even better
results. Similarly, the results obtained here are specific for the linear relation f = 1 + δp. Hence, it
might be interesting to analyze how different payoff–to–fitness relations modify the results, for instance
the exponential relations f = 1 + exp (p) or f = exp (p), as suggested by [Allen and Nowak, 2014,
Shakarian et al., 2012]. This may go along with experimental studies of different levels of the intensity
of selection δ, which is also opened up by the game landscape approach proposed in this paper. In
the case of weak selection, that is for δ → 0, the player–wise strategy landscapes lose their distinct
topological features, which yields (in the absence of replacement restrictions) a game landscape that is
neutral. Consequently, the game dynamics on this landscape would be random drift. For larger or large
values of δ the topological features of the player–wise strategy landscapes become more prominent,
and the game landscape is more rugged. From this line of argument it can be conjectured that there
is a direct relation between the intensity of selection and the ruggedness of the game landscape, which
might be verifiable by future studies.
4. The results of dynamic game landscapes presented are for up to N = 20 players. Naturally, it would
be desirable to extend the experimental setup to a larger population size. However, if the trends
identified in these results remain valid for a larger number of players needs to be studied in further
work, as the maximal number of players used was the upper limit that could be realized within a
reasonable time–frame and the computational resources available in this study. A general feature
surely is that the number of configurations to be analyzed in the landscapes increases exponentially
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with the number of players, hence setting bounds as to how far such experiments might be extendable.
Therefore, with the computational resources currently available the modeling framework is likely to
be confined to a moderate number of players. However, for an increased number of players there
is the framework of replicator dynamics which sufficiently describes game dynamics for populations
becoming large, [Traulsen et al., 2005].
5. Some primary experiments have shown that for replacement restrictions, the correlation between land-
scape measures on the one hand, and fixations and network properties on the other, cease. Apparently,
the replacement restrictions seriously modify the structure of the game landscapes. It is another open
question if these relationships can be reestablished by taking into account properties of the replace-
ment process, for instance the absorption structure of the restricted network. This may be extended
by foregoing the setting that the degree of the replacement matrix WR matches the degree of the
adjacency matrix AI .
6 Summary and conclusions
Coevolutionary games cast players that update their strategies as well as their networks of interaction.
In this study, a reinterpretation of coevolutionary games as dynamic fitness landscapes is proposed. The
dynamic landscapes are based on three major components: (i) a description of strategy updating as a Moran
process with definable probabilities of strategy transitions, (ii) a formulation of updating the interaction
network as instances of random regular graphs, and (iii) a linear relation between payoff and fitness. Using
these components, payoff–related fitness landscapes can be defined for each player. It is further shown
that coevolutionary game dynamics can be expressed by a game landscape derived from these player–wise
landscapes by including the strategy updating process. Moreover, different strategy updating processes,
such as death–birth (DB) or birth–death (BD) produce different game landscapes, which can be seen as
strategy updating breaking the symmetry of the play–wise landscapes. In numerical experiments it has
been demonstrated that landscape measures such as modality, ruggedness and information content allow
to differentiate between different game landscapes. Fixation probabilities and fixation times have been
calculated as well as network measures characterizing the networks of interaction of the coevolutionary
games. By correlation analysis it has been shown how the landscape measures relate to both fixation
properties and network measures.
The approach presented is a technique for analyzing coevolutionary games by landscapes. Moreover,
the approach is not restricted to Moran processes as long as strategy transition probabilities can be de-
rived, at least approximately. Finally, network updating is currently modeled as a given sequence of ran-
dom regular graphs, but should be understood as a transition process, for instance by using reproducing
graphs, [Southwell and Cannings, 2010] as a tool to refine the description of transitions between adjacency
matrices.
Different settings of the game represented by the numeric values of the payoff matrix and different
rules of the strategy updating result into a large variety of coevolutionary game dynamics. A consider-
able number of works have analyzed and discussed this game dynamics with respect to fixation properties
such as fixation probability and fixation time from both a theoretical as well as an experimental point of
view, [Allen and Nowak, 2014, Lieberman et al., 2005, Nowak, 2006, Pattni et al., 2015, Shakarian et al., 2012].
The results reported here contribute to this discussion by offering a fitness landscape view as an alterna-
tive explanatory framework. In other words, by the approach presented coevolutionary games may become
amenable to be analyzed by dynamic landscapes.
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Figure 1: Illustration of two-dimensional strategy landscapes ΛiΠ for a PD game with N = 4, d = 3 and
a complete interaction network with AI =
(
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
)
. Same colors give equal fitness values f = 1 + δp for
payoff p with δ = 0.25. Each strategy configuration pi = (pi1pi2pi3pi4) has N = 4 neighbors distanced by
Hamming distance H1d, while periodic boundary conditions apply. For each player the landscape has one
maximum; the player defects, while its three coplayers cooperate.
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(c)
Figure 2: Illustration of two-dimensional strategy landscapes ΛiΠ for a PD game with N = 4, d = 2 and
L2(4) = 3 different networks of interaction. Same colors give equal fitness values f = 1 + δp for payoff p
with δ = 0.25. (a) AI(0) =
(
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
)
(b) AI(1) =
(
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
)
(c) AI(2) =
(
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
. For each player and
all three interaction networks the landscape has two maxima; the player defects, while its two coplayers
cooperate. There are two maxima as the third player can do either way.
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Figure 3: Landscape measures as a function of the number of players N and coplayers d, while no replacement
restriction are imposed. Red lines give the results for BD updating, green lines are for DB updating. Vertical
spikes indicate the range between smallest and largest value. (a), (b) Modality measured by the number of
local maxima #LM , (c), (d) correlation length λ and (e), (f) information content hIC .
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Figure 4: Landscape measures as a function of the number of players N and coplayers d with replacement
restriction specified by the replacement matrix WR. Red lines give the results for BD updating, green lines
are for DB updating. Vertical spikes indicate the range between smallest and largest value. (a), (b) Modality
measured by the number of local maxima #LM , (c), (d) correlation length λ and (e), (f) information content
hIC .
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Figure 5: Fixation probability %c and fixation time τc of the cooperative absorbing configuration over N and
d. Red lines give the results for BD updating, green lines are for DB updating. No replacement restriction
imposed. Vertical spikes indicate the range between smallest and largest value over the considered interaction
matrices AI . (a), (b): Fixation probability %c, (c), (d): fixation time τc.
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Figure 6: Fixation probability %d and fixation time τd of the defective absorbing configuration over N and
d. Red lines give the results for BD updating, green lines are for DB updating. No replacement restriction
imposed. Vertical spikes indicate the range between smallest and largest value over the considered interaction
matrices AI . (a), (b): Fixation probability %d, (c), (d): fixation time τd.
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Figure 7: Correlation between fixation properties and landscape measures for the cooperative absorbing
configuration over the number of coplayers d. Red markers give the results for PD–BD, green for PD–
DB, blue for SD–BD, yellow for SD–DB. Fixation probability %c: (a) correlation length λ, (b) information
content hIC . Fixation time τc: (c) correlation length λ, (d) information content hIC . The information
content correlates well to the fixation properties, while the relation to the correlation length is weak. There
is no correlation for PD–BD as the fixation of cooperation is zero for this game and strategy updating.
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Figure 8: Correlation between fixation properties and landscape measures for the defective absorbing config-
uration over the number of coplayers d. Red markers give the results for PD–BD, green for PD–DB, blue for
SD–BD, yellow for SD–DB. Fixation probability %d: (a) correlation length λ, (b) information content hIC .
Fixation time τd: (c) correlation length λ, (d) information content hIC . As for the cooperative absorbing
configuration, the information content correlates well to the fixation properties, while the relation to the
correlation length is weak.
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Figure 9: Correlation between matrix measures and information content hIC over the number of coplayers d
while no replacement restrictions are imposed. Red markers give the results for PD–BD, green for PD–DB,
blue for SD–BD, yellow for SD–DB. (a) graph energy ene, Eq. (15); (b) independence number ind, Eq.
(16); (c) algebraic connectivity alc, Eq. (17); and (d) expander index exi, Eq. (18). All matrix measures
correlate well to the information content and the results are indistinguishable for BD and DB landscapes,
reflecting the symmetry properties of these landscapes.
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Figure 10: Correlation between matrix measures and information content hIC for replacement restrictions
specified by the replacement matrix WR over the number of coplayers d. Red markers give the results
for PD–BD, green for PD–DB, blue for SD–BD, yellow for SD–DB. (a) graph energy ene, Eq. (15); (b)
independence number ind, Eq. (16); (c) algebraic connectivity alc, Eq. (17); and (d) expander index exi, Eq.
(18). Replacement restrictions break the symmetry of BD and DB landscapes and weaken the correlations
between matrix measures and the information content.
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